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The Long-Term Care Insurance Program (LTCIP) in Israel is a social security program administered by the National
Insurance Institute (NII) since 1988. LTCIP focuses on home-based personal care services. Differently from most
other programs under the responsibility of the NII, LTCIP benefits are in-kind benefits and are delivered via multiple
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. In recent years LTCIP has been the target of various legal amendments
and numerous administrative changes. While many of these changes may have had significant effects on
individuals, they have not altered the fundamental principles of the program. Thus, many of the characteristics of
beneficiaries have remained quite stable over the years; other characteristics of the population of beneficiaries have
changed over the years reflecting the aging of Israeli society. A central issue related to LTCIP is whether benefits are
adequate to meet the needs of the growing elderly population of Israel. While the generosity of LTCIP benefits is
questionable, economic and political struggles have limited the scope of changes introduced thus far.
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Home care for the elderly is the main long-term care
(LTC) service to the elderly in Israel. In 2011, a monthly
average of 145,600 elderly people – constituting about
80% of the elderly in Israel receiving formal assistance –
lived in the community. Expenditure on Long-Term Care
Insurance Program (LTCIP) benefits in Israel reached NIS
4 billion (slightly over 1 billion US$) in 2011, or 0.5% of
Israel’s GDP [1]. Spending for LTCIP represents the ma-
jority of public spending on home care and institutional
LTC services in Israel – 69% of total public spending in
2010. Spending on LTCIP represented 63% of total spend-
ing on LTC services in the community in 2010 [2]: 91.
In the past 15 years, the share of elderly people – age 65
or over – has remained 9.8%-9.9%, after a gradual increase
from less than 5% in the 1950s [3]: 18. According to pro-
jections of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics [4]: 53,
the share of the elderly population is expected to increase
and reach over 14% within the next two decades. There-
fore, there is a need to review policies towards the elderly
and their implementation. Similarly to the case in otherCorrespondence: sharonas@nioi.gov.il
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orwelfare states, the number of elderly people in Israel in
need of LTC services is expected to rise, as are the costs of
these services. Thus, Israeli society should consider the
place and role of LTCIP within the broader framework of
social policies and their social and economic outcomes.
Programs like LTCIP have several roles. First, they rep-
resent a commitment of society in general to support
the non-medical needs of the elderly. Second, public
provision of formal care giving based on need serves the
goal of enhancing solidarity with the elderly and their
families and promoting redistributive justice within a
given society. Third, LTCIP is aimed at sharing with
family members the burden of care while not entirely re-
placing the family. In-kind and/or cash benefits assist in-
formal caregivers in coping with the physical, emotional
and economic burdens of care giving while strengthen-
ing the commitment of families to those in need. Fourth,
LTCIP encourages elderly people to keep living in their
communities for as long as they can and wish to. Last,
LTCIP influences unskilled sections of the labor market
as formal caregivers, and due to the massive role of non-
citizen labor migrants, it also contests the boundaries of
societies and their character.td. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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willingness of various groups or individuals in society to
contribute to the welfare of other groups or individuals,
based on a common belief that mutual support/cooper-
ation is needed for the cohesion of society [5]. Decisions
over the scope of solidarity – what is included and who is
included – result from politics and past decisions [6]. For
social programs it means that members of society both
make contributions and enjoy rights linked to their needs.
As institutions shape social interactions by creating roles
and expectations of actors [7], social programs develop
bonds among people that include moral commitments
and economic exchanges [8]. LTCIP is an institution, and
as such, is a mechanism used to organize the distribution
of material and/or symbolic values in a realm of life in a
given society [7].
LTCIP, at large, has proven to be resilient to radical
changes. Since its full introduction in 1988, few major legal
reforms have been introduced. Its goals, rules of entitle-
ment, basket of services and relationships among the main
actors have not been altered to any great extent. As pre-
sented below, the characteristics of the population of bene-
ficiaries have changed over the years to reflect the aging of
Israeli society, the aging of the elderly themselves and the
growing share of dependent elderly among the aged.
There has been extensive research on LTCIP. Numer-
ous studies have reviewed various aspects of it, including
its challenges and achievements [2,9-32])a. A small num-
ber of comparative studies of the Israeli case were pub-
lished [33-38]. Attention was also given to the question
of whether or not the benefits are generous and ad-
equate [10,11,16-18,22,39,40] b.
This article presents several issues regarding benefi-
ciaries and discusses the issue of the generosity of bene-
fits. The first section of the paper briefly outlines the
structure of LTCIP as well as its sources of financing
and scope of expenditure. The second section presents
data regarding trends among the beneficiaries. The third
section discusses the issue of the generosity of the pro-
gram towards its beneficiaries and its implications for
the solidarity of Israeli society with its aged population.
The first two sections of the article are a descriptive
analysis of the program, and the trends in the data pre-
sented will be evaluated to confirm certain elements of
the program experience. The third section focuses on
evaluating to what extent LTCIP has been able to
achieve its main goals of supporting the LTC needs of
frail elderly and to ease the burden on family support in
the changing social, economic, and cultural environment
of Israeli society c.
The topics centering on beneficiaries and distribution of
resources discussed in this paper are among the more
debated issues in recent years and they do not cover all
aspects of LTCIP (see Appendix B). In the last section ofthe article, I propose some topics for future research, some
of which are linked to issues discussed in this article.
LTCIP: an overview
LTCIP is administered by the National Insurance Insti-
tute (NII) d. It covers home-based personal care e. The
program is financed through employment-based payroll
contributions of both employees and employers, and in-
surance is mandatory. A share of the cost is financed
out of the general revenue f. LTCIP is income-tested
with the aim of excluding the highest income earners.
Israel’s system of LTC services is an income/means-
tested model [35]: 226–229, and one should distinguish
between the rules covering home-based care and those
applying to formal institutional care, and recognize the
exclusionary purpose of income-tests in LTCIP g.
LTCIP came into force in April 1988, 7.5 years after the
Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, approved an amendment
to the National Insurance Act [NIA]. LTCIP, a program
that has increased spending for LTC services for the eld-
erly in the long run, was legislated at a time of economic
austerity. At that time, from an economic point of view, it
was meant to weaken the pressures for larger funding for
institutional care with the promise to develop a much
cheaper framework for community care [18].
LTCIP is based on several principles. It is a social se-
curity programh. The program grants frail elderly people
in-kind benefits via not-for-profit and for-profit provi-
ders contracting with the NII within a quasi-market set-
ting. Less than 1% of beneficiaries receive cash benefits,
most of them as part of an experimental program (see
below) [41]. Services include assistance at home and
some household management (such as cleaning and
cooking) [42], care in day centers for the elderly, absorb-
ent undergarments, personal alarm units and laundry
services. Almost all beneficiaries receive assistance at
home and for many this is the sole service financed by
the NII [1]: 135.
Several rules of entitlement govern eligibility: the
claimant must be an Israeli citizen or a permanent resi-
dent; the claimant must be above the retirement age, i.e.
67 for men and 62 for women; the claimant must live at
home; the claimant must not receive an equivalent state-
funded benefit; the claimant and spouse must pass an
income test (savings, real estate, and property are not
included) i; the claimant must pass a dependency test.
The type of services and the identity of the providers are
determined by a local LTC committee composed of a
nurse, a social worker on behalf of the municipality and
a NII claim officer [30]: 237. The beneficiary (or her
family) can ask for a certain service or provider and the
local LTC committee accepts these wishes in most cases.
The total score in the dependency test is composed of
three parts (see Table 1) j. The first considers the extent
Table 1 Components of the dependency test
Criteria for assessment Score / Range of scores
ADL 0-8.5 in leaps of 0.5 (9 in rare cases can an
individual score 1 in both ‘falls’ and ‘mobility’)
Occurrence of falls 0-1
Mobility in the home 0-1
Dressing 0-1
Bathing 0-1.5
Eating and cooking 0-1.5
Control of urine and
bowel movements
0-1, 2-3
Need for supervision 0, 4 (partial; 2.5 until 31/12/2011), 9
(constant)
Living alone 0.5 (for those with 0–4 points in other parts),
1 (for 85 years-old blind persons living alone),
2 (for those with 4.5-9 points in other parts)
Total 0-11
Source: [1]: 125; [43].
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basic activities of daily living (ADL) l: bathing; dressing;
eating (and cooking) m; mobility in the home and the oc-
currence of falls; control of urine and bowel movements n.
The second part considers the need for permanent or par-
tial supervision due to cognitive, psychological or physical
limitations o. The third part is an additional score for
people living alone, as it is assumed that they require
greater formal care giving. The total dependency score is
the highest of the scores in the first two parts plus the
additional score for living alone. Thus, the dependency
score can run between 0 and 11.
Table 2 presents the distribution of ADL limitations
and their severity among beneficiaries in December 2011
as evaluated by their dependency score. The distributionTable 2 Distribution of LTCIP beneficiaries by score in various
December 2011 (in %)
Score /
Activity
Bathing Dressing Mobility in
the home
Oc
0 0.4 1.0 54.7
0.5 27.3 8.8 33.3
1 47.3 90.2 12.0
1.5 25.0 - -
2 - - -
2.5 - - -
3 - - -
9 - - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: [1]: 126.
Note: Data do not include beneficiaries who died or moved to an institution during
track” procedure (see below).of limitations seem to coincide with the gradual process
of ADL deterioration.
Table 3 presents the average score in each activity of
daily living for each dependency score among beneficiaries
in December 2011 (the need for supervision and an add-
itional score for people who live alone are included). One
can see the process by which one’s disabilities and their se-
verity widen as one’s dependency in old age increases. As
for most of those with 9 points and for almost all those
with 11 points – their dependency is determined by their
need of supervision. Thus, their range of physical disabil-
ities is quite wide.
The income test makes use of two thresholds. Indivi-
duals with no spouse are entitled to a full benefit if their
monthly income does not exceed the average wage and to
half the benefit if their monthly income does not exceed
1.5 times the average wage. Individuals with spouses are
entitled to a full benefit if their and their spouse’s monthly
income does not exceed 1.5 times the average wage, and
to half the benefit if their and their spouse’s monthly in-
come does not exceed 2.25 times the average wage.
Since January 2007 three levels of benefits exist. A total
score of 2.5 points in the dependency test is required to
qualify for a benefit. Individuals living alone require 2
points in their assessment to qualify as they receive an
additional 0.5 point (see Table 1). Levels of benefits are
calculated as percentages of a full general disability pen-
sion for a person without dependents (about a quarter of
the average wage). The levels of benefits are translated
into weekly home care hours: Individuals with a total
score of 2.5–5.5 points, 6–8.5 points and 9 points or more
in the dependency test receive a benefit at levels of 91%,
150% and 168%, respectively, equivalent to 9.75, 16 and 18
weekly hours, respectively. Individuals entitled to half the










78.5 29.6 5.7 80.4
17.6 18.4 82.6 -
3.9 16.4 8.0 -
- - 3.7 -
- 14.4 - -
- 11.5 - 2.5
- 9.7 - -
- - - 17.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
December 2011 or beneficiaries whose eligibility was determined in a “fast



















2.5 34,478 0.70 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.42 0.06 0.25
3 21,962 0.81 0.94 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.47 0.15 0.33
3.5 10,088 0.84 0.97 0.13 0.12 0.65 0.50 0.07 0.28
4 6,469 0.93 0.98 0.31 0.12 0.92 0.51 0.07 0.23
4.5 4,259 0.98 0.98 0.40 0.17 1.13 0.52 0.06 0.31
5 2,209 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.08 1.91 0.52 0.06 0.00
5.5 1,098 1.15 0.99 0.55 0.14 2.14 0.54 0.07 0.07
6 5,267 1.31 1.00 0.62 0.18 2.34 0.56 0.06 0.00
6.5 10,065 1.20 0.99 0.52 0.26 1.78 0.58 0.06 1.16
7 8,852 1.13 0.99 0.57 0.14 2.12 0.58 0.05 1.46
7.5 5,482 1.20 1.00 0.59 0.19 2.24 0.62 0.06 1.66
8 4,239 1.31 1.00 0.64 0.22 2.43 0.67 0.07 1.74
8.5 2,399 1.39 1.00 0.72 0.23 2.56 0.63 0.05 1.96
9 15,282 1.24 0.92 0.48 0.15 1.84 0.73 7.38 0.36
9.5 1,056 1.49 1.00 0.89 0.28 2.80 1.03 0.08 2.00
10 600 1.50 1.00 0.96 0.22 2.95 1.37 0.09 2.00
10.5 60 1.49 1.00 0.93 0.76 2.93 1.39 0.13 2.00
11 12,436 1.13 0.87 0.33 0.15 1.42 0.68 8.99 2.00
Source: [1]: 127.
Note: Data do not include beneficiaries who died or moved to an institution during December 2011 or beneficiaries whose eligibility was determined in a “fast
track” procedure (see below).
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caregivers, beneficiaries who are entitled to benefit at the
150% or 168% levels receive additional 3 and 4 weekly
home care hours, respectively. The distribution of benefi-
ciaries in terms of the number of weekly home care hours
they received as of December 2011 is shown in Table 4.
At the end of 2011 the beneficiaries in 9 regions (i.e. local
branches of the NII) out of a total of 23 regions were
allowed to choose between in-kind and cash benefits if they
meet following criteria [44]: they live in one of the 9 pilot
regions, they are entitled to benefit at the 150% or 168%
benefit level (or half those levels), they employ formal care-
givers for no fewer than 6 days a week, 12 hours a day, and
they present a signed contract with a formal caregiver who
is not a family member. If the formal caregiver is a non-
Israeli labor migrant, the claimant must possess a valid per-
mit from the Population and Immigration Bureau of the
Ministry of the Interior (MOI). People receiving cash bene-
fits receive 80% of the equivalent in-kind benefits. The gap
in values represents the service providers’ costs of operat-
ing their services and the additional taxes that they are
obliged to pay. Studies by the NII found out that benefi-
ciaries who receive cash benefits enjoyed a similarly high
quality of care as did beneficiaries who receive services
from LTC agencies [19]: 16–18; [45].In recent years various amendments to LTCIP were
introduced. Some amendments considered radical at first
glance are seen to be more moderate when considered over
time p: the introduction of a third, higher, level of benefit
in 2007 q has had a minor impact since the gap between
the two highest benefit levels is rather small; the introduc-
tion of cash benefits since 2008 r has been enjoyed by a
relatively small share of beneficiaries; increasing benefits to
beneficiaries employing formal Israeli caregivers since 2009 s
has had a minor impact due to the fact that the real cost of
employing a non-Israeli caregiver has not changed as well as
due to other factors that have affected the incentive for
employing non-Israeli formal caregivers (see Appendix B).
Other legal changes are related to rules of eligibility.
The retirement age for men and women was gradually
increased during 2004–2008 – from 60 to 62 for women
and from 65 to 67 for men. However, this too is not a
radical change. The under-70 age group has consistently
included only 1% or fewer LTCIP beneficiaries. More-
over, disabled individuals under the retirement age may
apply for an attendance allowance, which for some may
prove to be more generous than an equivalent LTCIP
benefit t. Among other changes in the rules of eligibility
are granting all 90 years-old or over the option to be
evaluated by a physician instead of a nurse, and later
Table 4 Distribution of permits for employing foreign workers as caregivers by LTC benefit level, December 2011
compared to December 2010
Benefit level Number of weekly
hours of home
care provided
December 2010 December 2011
(N) Have a valid
permit
Do not have a
valid permit
Total Have a valid
permit
Do not have a
valid permit
Total
45.5% 5 710 3,340 4,050 638 3,566 4,204
91% 9.75 2,672 72,658 75,330 2,243 74,664 76,907
75% 8/9.5 1,598 745 2,343 1,563 895 2,458
150% 16/19 15,000 18,584 33,584 14,745 20,141 34,886
84% 9/11 1,542 582 2,124 1,584 669 2,253
168% 18/22 15,147 11,218 26,365 15,807 12,512 28,319
Total 36,669 107,127 143,796 36,580 112,447 149,027
(% of total among
benefit level group)
45.5% 5 17.5 82.5 100.0 15.2 84.8 100.0
91% 9.75 3.5 96.5 100.0 2.9 97.1 100.0
75% 8/9.5 68.2 31.8 100.0 63.6 36.4 100.0
150% 16/19 44.7 55.3 100.0 42.3 57.7 100.0
84% 9/11 72.6 27.4 100.0 70.3 29.7 100.0
168% 18/22 57.5 42.5 100.0 55.8 44.2 100.0
Total 25.5 74.5 100.0 24.5 75.5 100.0
Source: NII – Research and Planning Administration.
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pilot plan, change in income tests to exclude some fi-
nancial sources of Holocaust survivors, extending the
duration of the experimental program for cash benefits,
and granting entitlements to beneficiaries temporarily
hospitalized u. Many of these changes affecting specific
groups of claimants or beneficiaries were proposed by
politicians, since a public outcry against how some ele-
ments of this program, such as the dependency tests
(see below), have been administered, generates increased
involvement of politicians. LTCIP has been a considered
by some politicians to be a favorable realm to promote
the welfare of the elderly population. LTCIP is a popular
social program, as younger people are familiar with
experiences of family members and/or realize that future
dependency at old age is common to all.
Various components of LTCIP are determined by pro-
cedures articulated by the NII as the law is applied into
real-life. Two examples are the dependency test and the
dependency scale. The content of the dependency test is
based on comparative experience in other countries and
has been examined from time to time by committees
that included experts in geriatric medicine [46,47]. The
exact procedures of the test are set by the professional
department at the NII [43]. Furthermore, the depend-
ency scale is not included in the NIA. The law asserts
that dependency should be based on severe physicallimitations or on a need for supervision, and sets three
levels of benefits (or two prior to 2007), labeling them
with vague titles. It has been the responsibility of the NII
to decide how dependency is measured and scaled, to
set a lower threshold for eligibility, to determine how
some situations such as living alone should be evaluated,
and so forth.
Some changes in the structure and content of the de-
pendency test in recent years have been due to com-
plaints of claimants against practices they considered to
be degrading and offensive. In the dependency test, clai-
mants may be asked to demonstrate several activities of
daily living. Some parts of the dependency test might be
considered by some claimants as intrusive or even de-
grading. Dressing and bathing seem to be the most diffi-
cult parts of the dependency test from the claimants’
point of view [48]. Following the Brill Committee in
2005 [47], in recent years, nurses have been asked to
base their evaluations on “indirect observations” of clai-
mants’ behavior rather than on claimants’ demonstra-
tions of activities of daily living, whenever possible [43].
It should be emphasized that the nurses conducting the
dependency test are instructed not to ask claimants to
undress, and demonstrations include wearing clothes
over clothes and washing one’s hands in order to ensure
claimants’ dignity [43]. Similarly, evaluation of “control
of urine and bowel movements” is based on other
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home and dressing, as well as questions presented to the
claimants and/or relatives [43].
In 2005 a survey conducted on behalf of a public commit-
tee set to examine the dependency test in LTCIP [47] found
out that among 294 claimants, satisfaction with various
parts of the functional evaluation and the attitudes of the
nurses performing the evaluations was correlated with the
outcome of one’s claim. While 83.3%-89.3% of respondents
whose claim was accepted answered that they felt comfort-
able with different parts of the evaluation, only 63.1%-71.5%
of the respondents whose claim was rejected felt the same.
As for the respondents’ evaluations of the nurses perform-
ing the evaluations, 84.9%-97.8% of the respondents whose
claim was accepted argued that the nurses treated them
with respect, while only 70.4%-91.5% of the respondents
whose claim was rejected felt the same. The rates of ap-
proval of various parts of the dependency test among those
who did not receive a decision prior to the survey were
closer to those whose claim was approved [48].
Other changes in the dependency evaluation process
include the introduction of a “fast track” procedure re-
placing the dependency test: based on medical docu-
mentation, people with very severe disabilities such as
advanced dementia receive the highest benefit [49]. Also,
a decision to increase the score in the dependency test
for a group of 85 years-old – or over – lonely blind
people resulted from a prior decision of the NII in one
case that led to public criticism of the NII [50]. In 2005,
due to a ruling of the National Labor Court, the NII
changed the definition of ‘living alone’ in the depend-
ency test to include persons who live with others whoTable 5 Expenditure on LTCIP (various years; 2011 prices)








1989 25,778 511 2.0
1992 28,562 858 3.0
1996 38,395 1,376 3.6
1999 45,989 1,930 4.2
2001 56,384 2,708 4.8
2002 55,408 2,995 5.4
2003 52,167 2,926 5.6
2006 51,927 3,137 6.0
2007 52,881 3,527 6.7
2008 53,607 3,622 6.8
2009 57,643 3,909 6.8
2010 59,942 4,134 6.9
2011 61,317 4,213 6.9
Source: [1]: 122, 135; [41].cannot take care of themselves (such as spouses eligible
for LTCIP or disabled children) [51].
Expenditure
LTCIP has become one of the fastest growing programs
administered by the NII in terms of expenditure. In just
over two decades the share of LTCIP out of NII’s total ex-
penditure on social security and income support increased
from 2% to 6.9% (see Table 5). From 1989 to 2011 expend-
iture on LTCIP increased at about 8.2 times – from NIS
511 million to NIS 4,213 million (in 2011 prices) com-
pared to an increase in the monthly average number of
recipients – about 6.8 times v.
Over the years, the share of insurance contributions and
Ministry of Finance (MOF) contributions w has decreased.
Thus, the NII has to allocate, according to the NIA, funds
from other programs to finance the rising costs of LTCIP.
The sum of insurance fees and government’s contributions
out of total sources of financing fell from 43% in 1994 to
34.7% in 2011. During 1994–2011 the share of insurance
fees in financing LTCIP gradually fell from 27.8% in 1994
to 14.9% in 2002. In 2011 the share of contributions fees
was 14.1%. The share of MOF contributions increased
from 15.3% in 1994 to 23.3% in 2002 due to the wave of
immigration from the FIS. Since 2004 the share of MOF
contributions fell (except in 2009) to 20.6% of total finan-
cing in 2011, as the share of uninsured immigrant elderly
in the Israeli society gradually decreased. The share of NII
in financing LTCIP (transfers of surpluses from other
branches of NII, mainly from the Children branch, to
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There are several groups that benefit from the resources
of LTCIP. The most obvious group is that of the frail
elderly in need of LTC services. Other groups are service
providers and their employees, including formal care-
givers, who are discussed in Appendix B.
The monthly average number of LTCIP beneficiaries
increased by 6.6 times in just two decades – from 21,359
in 1989 to 141,382 in 2010. Table 6 presents the trends of
growth in the number of beneficiaries and the number of
people aged over retirement age. During this period, the
relative number of LTCIP beneficiaries increased faster
than did the total number of elderly people. Thus, the
take-up rate among the elderly population has steadily
increased. The take-up rates since 2004 are actually higher
than the figures presented in Table 6 x. Thus, in 2010 the
real take-up rate was 17.4%.
Various factors can explain the growth in the number of
LTCIP beneficiaries. The growth of general elderly popula-
tion is one factor. Table 6 reveals a similarity between an-
nual changes in the total number of elderly people in
Israel and the total number of LTCIP beneficiaries during
1996–2010. 1997 and 2009 seem to be exceptions. The
gap has increased since 2004 as the retirement ages for
women and men were steadily increased.
Within the general elderly population, the aging of the
elderly population itself is a factor influencing the size
and scope of dependency, as levels of dependency in-







1995 624.0 - -
1996 641.4 17.4 2.8
1997 679.3 37.9 5.9
1998 695.7 16.4 2.4
1999 711.5 15.8 2.3
2000 728.7 17.2 2.4
2001 744.5 15.8 2.2
2002 758.1 13.6 1.8
2003 769.4 11.3 1.5
2004 780.6 11.2 1.5
2005 794.8 14.2 1.8
2006 813.9 19.1 2.4
2007 836.4 22.5 2.8
2008 859.1 22.7 2.7
2009 895.7 36.6 4.3
2010 925.2 29.5 3.3
Source: [41,52].
Note: Take-up rates among women aged 60 and over and men aged 65 and over.among beneficiaries are discussed below. Also, the stead-
ily rising take-up rates can be ascribed to the widening
awareness among the elderly population, as well as
among younger family members, of their rights to
LTCIP, the efforts of associations for the rights of the
aged and LTC agencies to spread information about the
program, and the intensified public debate about LTCIP’s
rules of eligibility and generosity of benefits, as well
as to the efforts of the NII to inform the public about
the program.
Trends in the composition of age and gender of the
elderly population in Israel are mirrored to some extent
by LTCIP beneficiaries [53]. As for age groups, the share
of people aged 85 or over out of the total elderly popula-
tion increased from 9% in 2000 to 10.8% in 2010. In the
same period, the share of LTCIP beneficiaries aged 85 or
over increased from 33.2% to 36.9%. As for gender
groups, the share of women among the elderly popula-
tion slightly increased: from 63.6% in 1995 to 64.8% in
2010. At the same period, the share of women among
LTCIP beneficiaries has slightly decreased: from 71.8%
to 70.9%.
Female and male beneficiaries have, on average, differ-
ent characteristics, which may shed some light on their
specific needs of LTC assistance and services. Among
women aged 62 years-old or over, 18.7% receive LTCIP
benefits, while only 14.5% of men aged 67 years-old or
over receive LTCIP benefits. Table 7 presents the distri-










59.0 - - 9.5
66.0 7.0 11.9 10.3
72.9 6.9 10.5 10.7
81.0 8.1 11.1 11.6
88.2 7.2 8.9 12.4
95.8 7.6 8.6 13.1
105.4 9.6 10.0 14.2
112.3 6.9 6.5 14.8
113.0 0.7 0.6 14.7
113.4 0.4 0.4 14.5
115.0 1.6 1.4 14.5
120.5 5.5 4.8 14.8
125.4 4.9 4.1 15.0
131.1 5.7 4.5 15.3
136.4 5.3 4.0 15.2
141.4 5.1 3.7 15.3
Table 8 The average age of LTCIP beneficiaries according
to gender, benefit level and living with or with no
spouse, December 2011
Benefit level 45.5% 75% 84% 91% 150% 168% Total
Female (all beneficiaries; N=105,801)
With no spouse 82.0 85.3 84.6 81.1 84.6 84.9 82.8
With a spouse 77.1 78.9 79.8 78.0 80.9 81.3 79.2
Gap 4.9 6.4 4.8 3.1 3.7 3.6 3.6
Female (aged 67 or over; N=102,896)
With no spouse 82.6 85.6 84.7 81.6 84.8 85.1 83.2
With a spouse 78.6 79.9 80.5 78.8 81.3 81.7 79.9
Gap 4.0 5.7 4.2 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.3
Male (all beneficiaries; N=43,225)
With no spouse 83.9 85.7 85.1 82.5 85.4 85.5 83.9
With a spouse 81.2 82.4 82.5 81.5 83.2 83.2 82.2
Gap 2.7 3.3 2.6 1.0 2.2 2.3 1.7
Source: NII – Research and Planning Administration.
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no spouse. Most female beneficiaries live with no spouse,
while most male beneficiaries live with a spouse. This
difference between women and men can be explained
by the life expectancy gap between them, as women
live longer y.
The average age of LTCIP beneficiaries in December
2011 was 82.1. The average age of female beneficiaries
was 81.7, and that of male beneficiaries – 82.8. The aver-
age age of beneficiaries living with a spouse was 80.6,
and that of beneficiaries living with no spouse was 83.0.
The average ages of beneficiaries receiving benefit at the
lowest, medium and highest benefit levels were 80.6,
83.7, and 83.9, respectively. The age gap between the
lowest level and the two higher levels represents the re-
lationship between age and greater need for long-term
care. Table 8 presents the average age of each of the
groups identified in Table 7. While most men, unlike
women, live with a spouse their need of formal care is
greater as they are older and their spouses (as well as other
relatives) cannot supply all needed care giving. Female
beneficiaries tend to receive benefits for a longer time than
do men (51.3 months compared to 46.1 months), as men
tend to enter the system, on average, at a later point of
their lives (78.8 for men and 75.9 for women) z.
The aging of LTCIP beneficiaries translates into
changes in the composition of benefit level groups as
the incidence and scope of limitations in ADL and the
need for supervision, due, for example, to dementia,
increase. In 1990, 24.3% of beneficiaries were eligible for
the higher benefit. Since 1998 the share of the benefi-
ciaries eligible for benefit at the higher level – or since
2007 at the two highest levels – increased from 21.8% to
45.1% in 2011. Many of the recipients of one of the two
highest levels are individuals whose LTC needs increased
over the years and their benefits were raised thereafter.Table 7 Distribution of LTCIP beneficiaries according to
gender, benefit level and living with or with no spouse,
December 2011 (in %)
Benefit level 45.5% 75% 84% 91% 150% 168% Total
Female
With no spouse 60.2 71.5 63.1 67.6 74.0 72.2 69.8
With a spouse 39.8 28.5 36.9 32.4 26.0 27.8 30.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 2,625 1,429 1,315 55,513 25,034 19,885 105,801
Male
With no spouse 40.3 42.3 36.5 36.0 36.4 33.7 36.0
With a spouse 59.7 57.7 63.5 64.0 63.6 66.3 64.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 1,579 1,029 938 21,394 9,851 8,434 43,225
Source: NII – Research and Planning Administration.36.9% of beneficiaries entered LTCIP in December 2011
with a lower benefit. This is expected, since the average
duration of eligibility for LTCIP benefits was 49.4
months in December 2011, based on NII data a.a.
LTCIP: generosity and solidarity
A major concern regarding LTCIP has been the ad-
equacy of its benefits, especially for those in need of as-
sistance and/or supervision for most hours of the day.
Are the resources of LTCIP allocated adequately: do the
severely frail receive enough home care? Answers may
be given from different perspectives. One is from within
the program – whether people experiencing different
levels of dependencies enjoy various benefits adequate
to their condition of dependency. Another way to evalu-
ate LTCIP is by comparing it to programs in other wel-
fare regimes.
The main goal of LTCIP has been to ease the physical
and emotional, as well as financial, burden of caring for
older family members, not to substitute for the family as
a prime source of care giving. However, as both the
number of beneficiaries and expenditure levels have
increased over the years and the costs of care giving for
families have risen as well, the question of whether the
structure of benefits should be amended has become a
pressing concern for decision-makers [31].
The LTCIP benefit system is based on a weak positive
correlation between dependency score and benefit level
[1]: 129; [30]: 235–236; [54]. First, severely dependent
persons are eligible for fewer weekly home care hours
per additional point of dependency; those with 2.5 points
enjoy 3.9 weekly hours per point while those with 11
points enjoy 2 or 1.64 weekly hours per point. Second,
the benefit system is quite regressive. Furthermore, one
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2.5 points and another with 5.5 points: both are entitled
to the same amount of weekly home care hours – 9.75 –
although one certainly needs greater assistance than the
other. Third, the current system is nonlinear, as exempli-
fied by the jump between 5.5 and 6 points. Such nonli-
nearity might act as an incentive to “push” individuals
located in these “borderlines situations” onto higher
levels on the scale to increase their benefits, or lower
levels on the scale to rollback expenditures.
Until recent years, the dependency score represented
the “desired” number of daily hours of home care
needed to help a frail elderly individual with activities of
daily living or with supervision; each 0.5 point repre-
sented a daily half an hour required for helping one’s ac-
tivity of daily living, based on analysis of experts [39,54].
Table 9 shows the gaps between the granted levels of
benefits and the “desired” levels (weekly hours = daily
hours * 7), as perceived in the past.
In recent years, the dependency score merely repre-
sents the level of dependency of a person in various ac-
tivities of daily living based on a structured dependency
evaluation [43] a.b.
Both decision-makers and the public at large realize that
the gaps between levels of benefits in terms of weekly
home care hours and the objective needs of severely







[1] as % of
[2]
2.5 9.75 17.5 55.7
3 9.75 21 46.4
3.5 9.75 24.5 39.8
4 9.75 28 34.8
4.5 9.75 31.5 31.0
5 9.75 35 27.9
5.5 9.75 38.5` 25.3
6 16/19 42 38.1/45.2
6.5 16/19 45.5 35.2/41.8
7 16/19 49 32.7/38.8
7.5 16/19 52.5 30.5/36.2
8 16/19 56 28.6/33.9
8.5 16/19 59.5 26.9/31.9
9 18/22 63 28.6/34.9
9.5 18/22 66.5 27.1/33.1
10 18/22 70 25.7/31.4
10.5 18/22 73.5 24.5/29.9
11 18/22 77 23.4/28.6twenty two weekly hours seems to be below a reasonable
minimum for public LTC program a.c.
Such a position is different from the stand presented by
the NII in the earlier days of the program. The first head of
the relevant NII department claimed [13]: 103; [14]: 85–86;
see also [55] that “the long-term care benefit is not
intended to replace the assistance given the severely
dependent elderly by his family. Moreover, the modest rate
of the benefit testifies to its reliance on the contribution of
primary caregivers of the severely dependent elderly in their
homes. The services given by family members to the elderly
are accepted as self-evident obligations, and there is no pay-
ment or other compensation made to the family for these
services”. Studies of the respective roles of formal care and
non-formal care, mainly family support, of the elderly
reached the conclusion that “Generally, formal home care
provided by the state was no substitute for family support,
but supplemented it” [56]: 25; see also [24,57,58].
Furthermore, even though benefits are targeted at eld-
erly people in need of meaningful help in basic activities
of daily living, benefits are not expected to fully cover
such individuals’ expenses. A fundamental principle is
that “the law should provide a moderate degree of aid to
a larger number of elderly persons, rather than providing
comprehensive assistance to a more limited number”
[13]: 103; [14]: 85; see also [55]. When LTCIP was intro-
duced, two achievements praised by its adherents were
that services are allocated based on a legal entitlement,
rather than as a voluntary act by the state or non-state
actors, and that the number of weekly home care hours
increased from 6 on the average a.d (“which is much less
than what is required” [18]: 7) to 10 or 15.
When entitlement rules for LTCIP were set in the
1980s, the NII was well experienced with disability pen-
sions. Thus, disability pensions served as a guide for the
new program [10,55]. The (then) two LTCIP benefit
levels were defined as percentages of the full disability
pension for an individual: 100% and 150%. The number
of weekly home care hours does not appear in the law.
From the beginning, the number of hours was set by
dividing the benefit rates with a fixed tariff for an hour
of home care. The tariffs for an hour of home care are
updated from time to time by a joint committee of the
Ministry of Welfare and Social Services (MOW) and
MOF [29]: 636.
Israeli society has changed a great deal since then. The
social roles of families as well as expectations from the
state in the realm of welfare have changed. The
liberalization of Israeli society changed the roles of vari-
ous sources of welfare such as the family and the state
[9,59-62]. Family structures, roles and responsibilities
have weakened in the past two decades [58,63,64].
Women, who carry most of the informal care giving re-
sponsibilities, are encouraged to join the labor market,
Asiskovitch Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:3 Page 10 of 19
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/3thus leaving them with less time and fewer resources to
support older family members [65]. While the role of the
state as a source of welfare has weakened since the 1980s,
socio-economic gaps and poverty in Israel have expanded
[1] due to the partial adoption of neo-liberal views and
liberalization transferring responsibilities for economic
welfare from the state to the market [66,67]. However,
public demand for public social services and welfare bene-
fits have not weakened, even if the mix of demands has
changed somewhat [68]. On this background, demands
for a greater public supply of LTC services for frail elderly
have increased over the years [30]: 235–236.
Shifts in political-economic regimes are not linear, co-
herent, or complete due to program-specific cultural, so-
cial and political factors [62]. LTCIP is an example of a
welfare state program that seems to change in various
directions at the same time – not only in the general dir-
ection of a macro-level institutional change of a nation’s
political-economic regime. On the one hand, whether
current benefit levels meet needs is questionable, and on
the other hand, some smaller changes to expand rules of
eligibility were introduced in recent years a.e.
Reforming LTCIP benefits faces political obstacles as
interests are affected. First, the consent of the MOF is
required to promote any reform that increases the total
spending on LTCIP. Second, if an increase in spending is
not on the agenda, resources should be transferred from
the less dependent to the more dependent elderly; that
is, reducing the weekly home care hours granted to the
less dependent a.f. As the less dependent constitute a
large group among the beneficiaries, jeopardizing their
vested interests is politically difficult. Third, every
change in the benefit scheme affects service providers,
which hold political influence over the decision-making
process. Fourth, such reforms require amending the
NIA, as LTCIP is one section of this Act. The legislation
process involves the NII executive board, the govern-
ment, the Knesset Committee on Labor, Welfare and
Health, and the Knesset general assembly.
Since the introduction of LTCIP, benefit levels have
been changed several times but none of the changes dra-
matically increased benefit levels. From April 1988 to
August 2000 an additional weekly hour was granted for
beneficiaries receiving home care from a not-for-profit
service provider. This discrimination was annulled in
September 2000. In July 2002 and July 2003, under the
Economic Emergency Plan Law and the Israel’s Eco-
nomic Recovery Law, the MOF promoted cuts in social
security programs, including LTCIP a.g.
In January 2007, as the atmosphere of economic crisis
that had characterized the beginning of the decade eva-
porated, a new and slightly more generous benefit was
introduced. Changes in LTCIP’s primary and secondary
rules may be the response to what is considered aschanges in the potential population of beneficiaries (the
aging of society and the share of frail elderly), their
needs and the required solutions available. The shift
from two to three benefit levels in 2007 is an example of
a change resulting from the acknowledgment that two
levels are not sufficient to meet the growing needs of the
frail elderly.
As some changes in LTCIP may increase expenditure,
an agreement between the NII and the MOF about
many primary legal amendments is required. In 2009
the MOF and the NII reached an agreement on in-
creasing benefits based on a principle other than the
needs and incomes of beneficiaries – that is, whether
they employ Israeli caregivers – in order to encourage
the employment of Israelis rather than foreign workers
(see Appendix B). In 2003, when the MOF proposed
cutting benefits for elderly people who employ non-
Israeli caregivers, the NII opposed the proposal by call-
ing it a “tax” on physically and economically needy per-
sons [69]: 20; see also [70].
Since the introduction of LTCIP, various proposals to re-
structure benefit levels were put forward and later dis-
missed, as the NII and MOF could not reach an agreement.
At the heart of these proposals was increasing the number
of benefit levels, reducing weekly hours for the less
dependent and increasing weekly hours for the more
dependent [31]. While the NII considered the need to re-
distribute resources according to need, the MOF opposed
proposals that meant increased spending [70,71]. When the
NII proposed changes within budgetary limits, the MOF
rejected NII’s position that current beneficiaries should
enjoy the reforms and demanded to restrict changes to new
beneficiaries [72,73], except where cuts were on the agenda
[69,70]. It is possible that the MOF was afraid that increas-
ing benefits for the severely dependent beyond a certain
threshold would create an incentive for people to demand
from the government greater level of responsibility than
they demand from other sources of care, such as the family.
In 2011, proposals for reform in the benefit level structure
of LTCIP were presented by both the NII (with the MOF)
and the Ministry of Health (see Appendix A).
Since the introduction of LTCIP, its generosity has not
dramatically changed. The number of frail elderly has
increased, and among them the share of the severely
dependent has rapidly increased – in 2000 22,789 elderly
people received the higher of two benefits, while in 2011
the comparable number of those receiving the two
higher benefits reached 65,636; from 23.8% of beneficiar-
ies to 45.1% in twelve years [1]: 123. However, benefit
levels, as well as the range of services, remained quite
intact. Most people eligible for one of the two higher
benefit levels require assistance and/or supervision for
many hours each day. Some require services for most of
the day, or even 24 hours each day. Two more hours per
Table 10 LTC users by age and gender, as a share of













Poland 2008 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.4
Korea, South 2008 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.2
Canada 2007 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.07 1.2
Slovenia 2008 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.8
Ireland 2008 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.09 N/A
Hungary 2008 0.08 0.17 0.06 0.12 0.3
Sweden 2008 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.11 3.6
Iceland 2008 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.13 1.7
Switzerland 2008 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.11 0.8
Netherlands 2007 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.13 3.5
Germany 2008 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.20 0.9
Finland 2008 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.23 1.8
Luxembourg 2007 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.23 1.4
Australia 2007 0.06 0.36 0.03 0.20 0.8
Czech
Republic
2008 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.24 0.2
New Zealand 2008 0.10 0.44 0.05 0.27 1.3
Norway 2008 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.32 2.0
Israel (III) 2008 0.13 0.47 0.06 0.32 0.7
Israel’s
ranking
- 1 1 1-4 1-2 13
Israel (IV) 2008 0.10 0.47 0.07 0.32 0.7
Israel’s
ranking
- 1-2 1 1 1-2 13
Source: NII – Research and Planning Administration; [35]: 41, 46.
Notes: (I) Data for Israel about users refer to LTCIP beneficiaries, only. Data for
Israel on public LTC spending as % of GDP refer to 2010 and include
community and institutional care ([2]: 90).
(II) Data for Israel includes beneficiaries of home-based care only. For countries
other than Israel, see notes in [35].
(III) For Israel, the population of women and men includes those aged 65 and
over who receive LTC services in the community under LTCIP.
(IV) For Israel, the retirement age for women is 62 and the retirement age for
men is 67.
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as considerations of greater needs and budgetary con-
straints met.
A concern of the government linked to increasing
LTCIP benefit levels is that such a move would encour-
age the employment of non-Israeli workers. Formally,
the higher benefits grant 16 or 18 weekly hours of home
care by non-Israeli caregivers. Yet in fact they cover –
whether in-kind or in cash – a meaningful portion of
the cost of employment of non-Israeli caregivers, up to a
third of the cost a.h. Increasing the highest benefit to 30
weekly hours would cover 60% of the cost of employing
a non-Israeli caregiver, and a benefit of 50 weekly hours
would cover the entire cost.
Increasing the number of weekly home care hours is
required to support the needs of those employing Israeli
caregivers, but as long as the legal framework for
employing non-Israeli caregivers is not changed, a rad-
ical reform in LTCIP benefits would face difficulties. On
the one hand, changing the legal framework and equaliz-
ing the costs of employing Israelis and non-Israelis
would increase the costs of employing non-Israeli work-
ers and increase the financial burden on frail elderly and
their families. On the other hand, widening the existing
differentiation of benefits based on the citizenship status
of the formal caregiver is considered by some as a dis-
crimination against those in need for 12–24 hours a day
of formal care, mostly delivered by non-Israelis, even
though the real needs covered are much greater in the
case of non-Israeli caregivers, as explained above. Others
are concerned about the expected costs of increasing
benefits to Israeli caregivers. In 2011 the cost of increas-
ing benefits for employing Israeli caregivers was around
NIS 195 million, and in 2011 – around NIS 211 million
– 5.2% and 5.5% of total expenditure on benefits, re-
spectively [41].
International comparisons of LTC programs and bene-
fit levels are not an easy task. LTC programs in different
countries vary regarding the population covered (elderly
people or the entire population), the services and their
methods of delivery (for example, whether benefits
can be paid for care by a relative), assessment methods
of disability and dependency, and methods of payment
of benefits (in-kind or cash). A comparison of five
countries (Austria, Germany, Israel, Japan and the
Netherlands) that was carried out about a decade ago
showed that Israeli LTCIP benefits at that time were
similar in generosity to the other case studies [34]. Two
features of the Israeli system stood out as unique in this
comparison: benefits in Israel were the most regressive
in terms of coverage of needs (see Table 9) and Israel’s
LTCIP had only two levels of benefits. Where the num-
ber of benefit levels is small, the distribution of
resources according to needs becomes less adequate. Inthe Israeli case, as discussed above, the results are overly
generous benefits for the less dependent and not-at-all
generous benefits for the severely dependent a.i.
In contrast to Israel’s relatively low benefit levels for
the severely dependent elderly, LTCIP covers a relatively
high share of beneficiaries among the elderly population.
Table 10 presents the situation in Israel in 2008 com-
pared to other OECD countries according to gender and
age group. If one adds institutional care, then the share
of the elderly (men aged 67 and over and women aged
62 and over) enjoying benefiting from public LTC ser-
vices increases from 17.5% to about 19.5% a.j.
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LTCIP remains rather resilient as far as the expectations of
beneficiaries are concerned; benefits are targeted at wide
populations with the aim of covering a portion of their
needs. Yet, from a distributive justice point of view,
resources are not adequately distributed according to need.
Conclusions: LTCIP goals and need for reform
The introduction of LTCIP generated several institu-
tional changes in the realm of LTC in Israel. Home-
based services in the community were limited in the
mid-1980s. In 1986 about 5,000 elderly people received
some home care services from the (then) Ministry of
Labor and Welfare, the Ministry of Health and Kupat
Holim Clalit [13]: 102; [18]: 7. In 1989 over 21,000 eld-
erly people received more services under LTCIP. There-
after, growth rates in the number of beneficiaries
outpaced the growth rates in the number of elderly
people in Israel. The introduction of LTCIP has gener-
ated the evolution of a multi-player not-for-profit and
for-profit, service providers. The state has financed the
development of a robust and competitive service system
from which frail elderly and their families benefit.
Over the years since the introduction of LTCIP, while
the growth in the number of beneficiaries outpaced the
growth of the elderly population in Israel, the character
of the population of beneficiaries changed reflecting
changes in the elderly population in the country as a
whole. The relative share of men and women among the
beneficiaries has slightly changed and the share of the
aged who are more dependent has increased, reflecting
the aging of the Israeli elderly in general. LTCIP’s legal
rules were amended numerous times, especially in the
last decade, and the administrative orders that guide its
day-to-day implementation are constantly under review
and adapted to meet requests from the public. Even
though legal changes and administrative procedures may
be meaningful in individual cases for beneficiaries, for-
mal caregivers or service providers, most changes in
LTCIP have been rather gradual, and not radical [7] a.k.
These two aspects – of the law and of the beneficiaries –
demonstrate the basic resilience and stability of this wel-
fare state program.
The introduction of LTCIP has shifted the burden of
LTC services from focusing on institutional care to the
community and home care. LTCIP has not narrowed the
use of institutional solutions, but in recent years the
growth rate in the number of beds in LTC institutions
has become more moderate. From 1990 to 2000 the
number of beds increased by 47.7%, from 19,041 to
28,131. At the same time, the growth rate of the aged 75
+ outpaced the growth rate of the number of beds, as
the ratio of beds per 1,000 aged 75+ fell from 103 to
102. The decrease in this ratio was even sharper in the1980s – from 113 to 103. From 2000 to 2009, the num-
ber of beds increased by only 4.1% a.l. The beds per
1,000 aged 75+ ratio fell to 83 [3]: 326. It seems that the
growth in rate of elderly people enjoying LTCIP has con-
tributed to this trend.
One of the contributions of LTCIP – even if it was not
a goal of the program originally – was the employment
of many individuals who otherwise would have faced dif-
ficulties in the labor market [14]: 95–96. Most of these
caregivers are non-professional, part-time and temporar-
ily hired, and low-paid workers. Most of them are
women and many immigrated to Israel since 1990. The
status and income of these formal caregivers is an issue
that has been considered by decision-makers [30,31,74].
One cannot ignore the contribution of LTCIP to meet-
ing the needs of frail elderly people in Israel. In that re-
spect, LTCIP contributed to the solidarity between the
aged and the rest of society as it met some of the needs of
many frail elderly [13]: 112. Yet, as Israeli society, and its
fundamental institutions such as the family, changes over
time, the question of whether LTCIP’s goals, rules of eligi-
bility, and methods and levels of benefits are adequate or
need to be adapted is under continuous public debate.
The article raises several issues that decision-makers
should pay attention to, and many of these issues are
currently on the policy agenda a.m. First, it seems that
some reforms in the rules of LTCIP, especially the struc-
ture of benefit level, are required. Other than the polit-
ical difficulties linked to the implementation, there is
uncertainty about the implications for the behavior of
clients and of service providers. Second, the growing
number of frail elderly people and the expected aging of
the Israeli society have implications for the financial sta-
bility of LTCIP and that of the NII in general. Perhaps
the methods of financing of LTCIP, such as raising NII
insurance fees dedicated to LTCIP, should be evaluated.
Reforming the structure of the benefit levels may have
future financial implications, since the behavior of cli-
ents and service providers and their interactions with
the NII may change once the rules are changed.
Other issues are linked to the brief discussion in
Appendix B. First, the NII should develop mechanisms to
evaluate and supervise the quality of care under LTCIP
and enhance its regulatory role, rather than leaving the
supervision to the claimants/beneficiaries and their fam-
ilies or to the service providers themselves. Second, Ap-
pendix B points to the place of foreign caregivers and the
aging of Israeli caregivers. A wide use of foreign caregivers
has social implications that might contradict targets
related to the scope and quality of care and restraining
expenditures. To sum up, the decision on whether or not
to adapt LTCIP to the changing needs of the elderly has
implications not only on the elderly in Israel, but on Israeli
society as a whole.
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search, such as the changes in the respective roles of for-
mal care and family support for the elderly within a
liberalized welfare state, the factors (socio-demographic
and economic as well as policy implementation) that affect
access to LTCIP and take-up rates and the influence of
globalization of the labor market on the relationships of
beneficiaries and families, service providers and formal
caregivers. This paper did not address some of the pol-
itical aspects of LTCIP that deserve further research,
such as the satisfaction of claimants and beneficiaries
from LTCIP and public support of LTCIP and NII and
their effects on the mechanisms through which the NII,
service providers, and the public interact to change
LTCIP and the distribution of resources to LTCIP and
within LTCIP.Endnotes
a Some of these studies focus on the implications of
LTCIP on beneficiaries and their family members (infor-
mal caregivers) [22,24,56,57,75-78], formal caregivers
[27,78] and service providers [26,79-85]. Several studies
and government reports have considered the place of
foreign caregivers [86-93].
b A unique place is given to the issue of method of
payment of benefits – whether in-kind or in cash
[13-16,25,31-33,65]; see also [19].
c Other important measurements of success such as
satisfaction of beneficiaries, claimants and family mem-
bers from LTCIP and the program’s public support de-
serve separate studies.
d In the Israeli case, private LTC insurance schemes are
offered by the four Sick Funds (not-for-profit medical ser-
vices providers and insurers responsible for delivering ser-
vices listed under the National Health Insurance Act,
1994) via insurance firms and by 8 insurance firms (as of
2010). Private LTC insurance is not conditioned by or
linked to eligibility to LTCIP, and a person can receive
benefits from public and private sources at the same time.
These insurance schemes cover both the elderly and
younger people. The private insurance schemes differ by
their premium levels (which are age-related), rules of eligi-
bility (including LTC needs, based on an ADL evaluation,
and previous medical conditions to some extent), waiting
times, periods of benefits, and levels of benefits for home
care and institutional care [94]; see also [95]. The insur-
ance firms offering these plans claim that they are more
generous than the public LTCIP, thus better meeting the
growing needs of frail elderly people. While levels of bene-
fits for home care, whether in cash or in-kind, are in most
cases higher in these programs than in the LTCIP, the pre-
miums are usually higher than the national insurance fees
for LTCIP.e The cost of long-term institutionalization is shared by
the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Wel-
fare and Social Services (MOW) and copayments [2,17].
f The government finances the cost of benefits for Jew-
ish immigrants who are not insured under the law; in re-
cent years the share of this group out of total benefit
recipients has slightly decreased – to about a fifth. Since
1990, the government also pays the NII a share of the
employers’ contributions to LTCIP as part of its policy to
ease the tax burden on the employers in order to reduce
labor costs.
g The rules of income/means-testing used by the
MOW and the MOH for public financing of institutional
care are much stricter, and include income and means
testing of the elderly and their spouses and income test-
ing of children and children’s spouses.
h Whether or not LTCIP can still be considered a so-
cial security program cannot be answered easily. On the
one hand, legally, it is defined as a social security pro-
gram and one of its sources of funding is insurance fees
paid by employees and employers. On the other hand,
the share of insurance fees in its financing has decreased
over time, as presented below. Moreover, while legal
amendments to LTCIP with budgetary implications re-
quire the agreement of the Ministry of Finance (see
below), the public – claimants, beneficiaries and their
relatives were successful in pushing the National Insur-
ance Institute to introduce changes to other parts of the
program such as the dependency evaluation process –
and the politicians to introduce several legal changes
regarding rules of eligibility (see below).
i It was introduced due to budget constraining consid-
erations [96] at about the same time that income-testing
was included in the child allowance scheme. Income-
testing in the child allowance scheme was abolished in
1993.
j I wish to thank Brenda Mroginstin, who was involved
in formulating the rules of LTCIP, for pointing out to me
some of the considerations that shaped the principles of
dependency test when it was first included in LTCIP.
The decisions to include ADL but not IADL, and to
limit the definitions of dependency to a need of help of
another person, but not the use of durable medical
equipment, resulted from a need to harmonize between
contradicting professional considerations and economic
constrains – to identify the needy and to restrain
expected costs.
k In most cases the use of durable medical equipment,
such as cane or a walker, do not grant a score in the de-
pendency test, but the use of a wheelchair does.
l The ADL section in the dependency test used in
LTCIP was developed in the Attendance Allowances
Program in the NII that grants cash benefits to disabled
individuals who require assistance in ADL [97]: 34. Over
Asiskovitch Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:3 Page 14 of 19
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diverted from one another in their internal rules. The
ADL section in the dependency test in LTCIP has some
resemblance to the Katz ADL index [98], although they
are not identical in the definition of activities considered
or the scoring method (see Table 1) [99]. The activities
“going to toilet” and “continence” are combined under
“control of urine and bowel movements”. The activity
“transfer” is one part of mobility in the home. Also, the
dependency test includes a section aimed at evaluating
the need for supervision [43].
m The dependency score for eating and cooking
includes assistance in taking medications.
n Since its introduction, the dependency test in LTCIP
included ADL and the need for supervision. Inclusion of
IADL (instrumental activities of daily living) or expanding
the criteria of ADL to include mobility outside the home
are expected to increase the number of beneficiaries and
total expenditure [3]: 124–125; [10]; see also [100]
o The section in the dependency test that examine the
need of supervision was thoroughly reviewed in the late
1990s and early 2000s following recommendations of
committees staffed by experts in psycho-geriatric medi-
cine and NII officials [46,101].
p The use of “radical” or “moderate” to evaluate
changes in a social program such as LTCIP draws
from J.L. Campbell’s conceptualization of “institutional
change”, which is based on the researcher’s identification
of the central dimensions of an institution and a deci-
sion of the right time frame for evaluation of change’ or
lack of it, i.e. stability [7]. In the case of LTCIP, the
evaluation of the magnitude of change is based on iden-
tification of the principles of the program and how
amendments changed them or affected beneficiaries
since their introduction.
q Codex, No. 2077, 11.1.2007, p. 52.
r Codex, No. 2080, 1.2.2007, pp. 108–109.
s Codex, No. 2203, 23.7.2009, pp. 248–249.
t Attendance allowances are cash benefits. In Decem-
ber 2011, 7,179 elderly people received attendance allow-
ances compared to 6,574 in December 2010 [53].
u Bills, No. 169, 23.7.2007, p. 270; Bills, No. 292,
14.12.2009, p. 60; Bills, No. 301, 19.1.2010, p. 89; Bills,
No. 405, 25.7.2011, p. 236; Bills, No. 619, 19.9.2011, p.
1628; Codex, No. 2139, 18.3.2008, pp. 252–253; Codex,
No. 2225, 4.2.2010, p. 327; Codex, No. 2277, 17.2.2011,
p. 355; Codex, No. 2310, 11.8.2011, p. 1024; Codex, No.
2331, 12.1.2012, pp. 110–111.
v One can compare the development of LTCIP to
other benchmarks: during 1989–2009 the number of
elderly people aged 65 and over increased 1.8 times [52];
during 1991–2010 the entire population of Israel
increased by 1.5 times and Israel’s national expenditures
for health-care increased 2.1 times [102]: 50.w MOF contributions finance LTCIP benefits for unin-
sured immigrant elderly.
x As mentioned above, during 2004–2008 the retire-
ment ages for women and men were gradually raised
from 60 to 62 and from 65 to 67, respectively.
y Another explanation, not studied in this paper, might
be the role of institutions for elderly women and men,
and which the men and women choose, or their families
choose for them.
z Since part of the gap is due to a variation in the
minimum age for eligibility between women and men –
among beneficiaries who became eligible for the first
time at the age of 67 or over, men first become eligible
at the age of 78.8 while women first become eligible at
the age of 77.1.
a.a The average duration of eligibility for LTCIP is cal-
culated based on the records of beneficiaries who
entered the LTCIP system starting January 1998, or later,
and exited the system due to death, moving to an insti-
tution, or their eligibility was temporary (a total of
96,837 records).
a.b I wish to thank Orna Zamir and Roni Dinur from the
LTC Department of the NII for pointing this out to me.
a.c Holocaust survivors who receive one of the two
highest LTCIP benefits also receive additional home-
based care in the amount equivalent to 9 weekly hours
from The Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust Vic-
tims in Israel [103]. This is a voluntary non-state
arrangement.
a.d Services provided by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health and the General
Sick Fund in the pre-LTCIP era [18].
a.e See the discussion in the section “LTCIP: an over-
view” in this paper.
a.f In recent years, the position of the LTC Department
of the NII has been that beneficiaries with 2.5-3 depend-
ency points enjoy greater number of weekly home care
in relative to their needs. This impression is based on
comments from beneficiaries themselves as well as from
their relatives who cannot keep the formal caregivers oc-
cupied for the entire time. I wish to thank Orna Zamir
and Roni Dinur from the LTC Department of the NII for
pointing this out to me.
a.g In July 2002 the lower benefit level was cut from 11
to 10.5 weekly hours and the higher level was cut from
16 to 15.5 weekly hours. In July 2003 the lower level was
cut from 10.5 to 9.75 weekly hours.
a.h The monthly cost of employing a non-Israeli
caregiver was 7,500 NIS in 2010 [92]. The legal frame-
work covering the employment of non-Israeli care-
givers maintains that they are not eligible for overtime
pay [104]. In 2010, the value of the highest in-kind
monthly benefit was NIS 3,392, and that of cash bene-
fit was NIS 2,714. This means that the LTCIP benefit
Table 11 Reform proposal discussed by the NII and the
MOF during 2011
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a non-Israeli caregiver (see also [20]: 687). Thus, there
are incentives for hiring foreign caregivers.
a.i Based on a comparison between Israel (see Table 9)
and Germany. For Germany see [105]: 72; [106]: 46–47.
a.j In 2008 there were about 15,400 public subsidized
beds in institutions for LTC for the aged [107,108]. With
addition of elderly recipients of attendance allowances
(5,793 in December 2008; see [109]: 220), the share of
elderly (men aged 67 and over and women aged 62 and
over) enjoying public LTC services and/or funding is
20.3%.
a.k For example, the introduction of cash benefits has
been limited to only 9 of the 23 local NII branches
under an “experimental program” and only 8% of the po-
tential beneficiaries in the four branches where the pro-
gram started in March 2008 opted to receive cash
benefits by the end of 2011 [1]: 132–134.
a.l The number of beds reached a peak in 2004 –
30,775 [110]: 298.
a.m For reforms in the structure of benefit level, see
above. For efforts to evaluate the financial implications
of LTCIP on the NII in the future, see [111]. Regarding
regulating quality of care, this issue is at initial stages of
development at the NII. For some of the measures used
to restrain the employment of foreign workers and en-
courage Israeli workers in LTC, see Appendix B.
a.n In [112] an earlier version of the reform proposal
was published in the press.
a.o Figures were adapted to available data for March 2012.
Source: NII – Research and Planning Administration.
a.p According to the director general of MATAV, the
largest not-for-profit service provider of LTC services,
the reform proposal may grant the sick funds too much
power and might lead to a conflict of interests between
the sick funds’ responsibilities of management of care
and provision of services against the interests of the
beneficiaries. A senior management at DANEL, one of
the largest for-profit service providers of LTC services,
was concerned that transferring responsibilities to the
sick funds would not benefit the beneficiaries. See sum-
mary of these comments in [113].
a.q Such concerns were raised by the Director General
of the NII, the Deputy Head of the Budget Department
at the MOF and senior managers of Maccabi Sick Fund
(the second largest sick fund) at the 14th Seminar in the
Memory of Rafi Rotter held at November 22, 2012 and
focused on the reform proposal of the MOH.
a.r In the proposal, the addition to the final depend-
ency score for people living alone is different than the
current situation, thus comparing the change in benefits
for individual cases is not intuitive. Also, the maximum
dependency score is 10.5, not 11, according to this pro-
posal [1].a.s See data regarding Israeli formal caregivers below.
a.t Schmid and Borowski found that in the late 1990s
the formal caregivers’ average age was 43 [27]: 94.Appendix A
Ministry of Health (MOH) and NII-MOF joint LTCIP
reform proposals
The NII and the MOF held discussions following an
initiative of the NII to restructure benefits according to
perceived needs by increasing benefits for the severely
dependent at the expense of the less dependent a.n.
Table 11 presents this reform proposal. Even though the
joint NII-MOF proposal does not eliminate the nonli-
nearity problem, it still increases benefits as levels of de-
pendency rise, and it offers more assistance for those in
greater need.
This proposal was vaguely incorporated into the Trach-
tenberg Report [114]: 143–144 following the “social un-
rest” of summer 2011 in Israel. While benefits for the less
dependent are reduced by up to 3.75 weekly hours, bene-
fits for the more dependent are increased by up to 8
weekly hours. The main criticism of the proposal was
raised by the MOH, as 55.1% of beneficiaries are expected
to experience a decrease in care services while only 38.1%
will enjoy an increase [115] a.o. The reason is that more
beneficiaries are less dependent.
Recently, the MOH proposed to reform the entire
LTC system by consolidating services under the
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ber of weekly home care hours for frail elderly based on
their scope of dependency and incomes [2]; see also
[17]. According to this proposal, benefits would be
increased to up to 33 weekly home care hours, higher
benefits (additional 2.5-10 weekly hours) would be
granted for employing Israeli caregivers, benefits for the
less dependent would not be reduced, income-testing
would be terraced – but the program would cover the
highest income earners as well – and additional spend-
ing would be allocated. Such a reform is expected to in-
crease total expenditure for all LTC services – in the
community and institutional – and to mobilize oppos-
ition from major stakeholders such as the NII, service
providers a.p, and the sick funds expected to be affected
by it [113], as well as the MOF. The NII is concerned
that the proposal of the MOH may jeopardize the qual-
ity of care provided for the elderly, while the MOF is
worried that the financial stability of the sick funds
might be at risk. The sick funds have been reluctant to
support this initiative due to a possible scenario of insuf-
ficient funding a.q.
Appendix B
The “LTC industry” – service providers and formal
caregivers
The introduction of LTCIP generated the development
of what several commentators called the “LTC industry”
[25]: 197; [79]: 182. The LTC industry includes various
for-profit and not-for-profit service providers delivering
LTCIP services. Prior to LTCIP, only one, not-for-profit,
organization – MATAV – handed LTC services for the
elderly. Following LTCIP, the number of service provi-
ders has increased dramatically. These organizations em-
ploy a growing number of Israeli caregivers or foreign
LTC laborers. In August 2011, 112 LTC companies deliv-
ered home care services under LTCIP. Forty-six com-
panies were not-for-profit, but the share of home care
hours delivered by the other 66 for-profit companies
reached 72.2% in August 2011. The share of home care
hours delivered by for-profit companies is on the rise:
their share of total home care hours, which started at
49% in 1989, increased to 60.1% in 1995, to 69.5% in
2002, and to 70.8% in 2009 [53].
LTCIP is arranged in a format of quasi-markets where
the state sets standards and prices while service providers
compete over beneficiaries and quality of services within
fixed prices [16]: 55. The supervising role of the state over
the quality of services delivered is a modest one. The in-
crease in the number of beneficiaries and of service provi-
ders over the years has limited the capabilities of the NII
and the local LTC committees to supervise their opera-
tions and quality of care [15]: 37; [28]: 606; [30]: 245–249.
LTCIP is based on the assumption that multiple serviceproviders and competition among them is the best way to
ensure adequate services, as beneficiaries can ask the ser-
vice provider to change their formal caregiver or to switch
to another service provider altogether.
A common perception about LTC for the elderly in
Israel claims that most formal caregivers are foreign
workers. According to estimations published by the
OECD, the share of foreign workers in Israel’s LTC sec-
tor’s workforce reached 50% in 2010 [35]: 174. In De-
cember 2011, 36,600 LTC beneficiaries held a valid
permit for employing a foreign worker compared to
36,700 beneficiaries in December 2010. During 2011, the
total share of holders of a valid permit among all benefi-
ciaries fell from 25.5% to 24.5%. Similar drops can be
noticed in all benefit levels (see Table 4). About one-
third of formal caregivers are foreign workers a.s.
Since March 2009 the weekly home care hours for
those eligible for LTCIP benefits at one of the two higher
levels was increased by 3 and 4 hours, respectively.
These additions might postpone the need to hire a for-
eign caregiver, available for up to 24 hours a day, for
those beneficiaries who need care for only several hours
every day. However, it seems that the main cause of the
freeze in the number of foreign workers in the LTC sec-
tor has been the government’s policy since June 2010 of
setting quotas for the number of LTC foreign caregivers
that agencies may bring to Israel, based on the rates of
their success in assigning LTC foreign workers already in
Israel [116,117].
The number of Israeli formal caregivers increased from
about 20,000 in the early 1990s [14], to 50,000 at the early
2000s [15] to almost 70,000 in December 2011. The ma-
jority of formal caregivers – 92.8% – are women, and
many of them – 43.9% – immigrated to Israel since 1990.
As can be figured by their occupation, most are non-pro-
fessional, low-paid, part-time, and temporary employees
who belong to the lower strata of Israeli society.
The mean age of Israeli formal caregivers is 48.2, and
their average age has risen over the years a.t. Female care-
givers’ average age is lower than that of male caregivers –
48 compared to 50.4. Post-1990 immigrant caregivers’
average age is much higher than the average age of the
other caregivers – 52.8 compared to 44.5. The oldest
group among Israeli caregivers is that of male post-1990
immigrants – 56.8. The average age of female post-1990
immigrant caregivers is 52.5. The average age of female
and male caregivers born in Israel or immigrated before
1990 is similar – 44.6 and 44.3, respectively.Abbreviations
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